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Abstract. In this paper, we show a manner to use properties of the
permutation group on some binary linear codes to improve the decod-
ing algorithms. We search especially for particular permutations and we
prove bounds on dimension of a special subcode of the idempotent sub-
code. This σ-subcode can have very lower dimension in practice than the
original code. We give several examples at the end and explain what can
be the gain with this way of decoding.
Keywords: permutation group, σ-subcode, idempotent subcode, de-
coding, Goppa code, quasi-cyclic code
1 Introduction
Binary-linear codes with non-trivial automorphism groups appear in various
domains in the field of coding theory (Reed-Solomon codes, Reed-Muller codes,
quasi-cyclic codes and BCH codes, see [4]). Usually they come with a polynomial
time decoding algorithm.
In code-based public key cryptography equally, it happens that one can find
codes with non-trivial permutation group :
⋄ Goppa codes are used in the original McEliece cryptosystem [1]. When these
codes have a generator polynomial whose coefficients are in a subfield of
the support, the corresponding codes have a non trivial permutation group
[11] and it can be used to strengthen the cryptosystem against the decoding
attacks [12].
⋄ More recently, quasi-cyclic codes have been used in McEliece type cryptosys-
tem and these codes have a non trivial permutation group too [13].
⋄ Some compression functions in hash function involve quasi-cyclic codes too
[14].
These systems can be attacked by generic decoding algorithms [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9]. For binary linear codes, the NP-hardness of the Maximum-Likelihood
Decoding (i.e. decoding up to w errors, with w fixed) was proved in [2]. However,
none of these generic decoding algorithms take into account the fact that the
permutation group is non-trivial, whereas it is possible to recover information
on the permutation group by using the support splitting algorithm [15], [16].
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A first attempt to improve generic decoding algorithm using the permuta-
tion group was by MacWilliams in 1964, on cyclic codes [3]. She presented an
information set type decoding algorithm for cyclic codes by using the cyclic per-
mutation on the codewords and the multiplication by 2 modulo the length of
the code. For the cyclic permutation, a theoretical evaluation was made more
recently in [10].
In this paper, however, we investigate another manner to use the permutation
group of codes.
The idea is the following one : Suppose that someone receives the vector y
(in data transmission for example) such as y = c + e, where c is a word of a
binary [n, k, d] linear code C and e is an error vector of length n and weight t.
Decoding consists in removing errors (due to noise for instance) and recovering
c (or equivalently e) from the only knowledge of y and C.
Moreover, suppose that the receiver knows the permutation group Perm(C)
of C (or part of the permutation group ; we will define it more rigorously in the
next section). Then the receiver can compute the vector :∑
i
λiσi(y) =
∑
i
λiσi(c) +
∑
i
λiσi(e)
where (σi)i ∈ Perm(C) and (λi)i ∈ F2. Thus, c
′ =
∑
i λiσi(c) lives in a par-
ticular subcode, the σ-subcode (it will be defined more rigorously in the next
section), of C with probably lower dimension than k and e′ =
∑
i λiσi(e) is an
error vector of weight ≤ λt, where λ is the number of non-zero λi.
Therefore, if the dimension of the σ-subcode is small enough, by doing a
decoding exhaustive search, one can expect to find the possible values of e′ (there
is no longer a unique solution) which will give information on the positions of
error in e.
This particular use of permutations is strongly based on the trade-off : mod-
erate increase of the number of errors (by choosing adequate λi) and significant
decrease of the dimension of the σ-subcode compared to k.
However, in general case, it is difficult to estimate the properties and the
dimension of the σ-subcode. We are interested here in the paper by the sim-
plest linear combination c′, and we suppose that their exists an element of the
permutation group of order 2.
In the first part we recall some basic background, then we prove bounds on
the dimension of the σ- subcode and we explain how to use it for decoding,
finally we give some examples.
2 Background
2.1 Permutation group of a code
We will only focus on binary linear codes of length n, that is to say F2-vector
subspaces of Fn2 . Let C be such a code with dimension k (as a vector subspace).
Since we talk about it from beginning, define precisely now what we call the
permutation group of C.
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Definition 1. Let σ ∈ Sn be a permutation of the set {1, . . . , n}. These permu-
tations act on words of Fn2 as follows:
if c = (ci)i∈{1,...,n} is a word of F
n
2 , σ(c) = (cσ−1(i))i∈{1,...,n}
We define the permutation group of C as the set
Perm(C) = {σ ∈ Sn | σ(C) = C} where σ(C) = {σ(c) | c ∈ C}.
For instance, since we introduce them :
– the permutation group of an l-quasi-cyclic code contains the cyclic shift of l
positions and its powers.
– the permutation group of a Goppa code whose generating polynomial has
coefficients in the subfield F2s of F2m contains the group generated by the
Frobenius automorphism of F2m/F2s .
2.2 Definition of the σ-subcode
In the introduction, we supposed that the receiver knew a part of Perm(C) and
we took linear combinations of σi(y). To simplify and to be able to show proper-
ties of the σ-subcode, we have to restrict to special permutations in Perm(C).
Suppose now that we can find in Perm(C) a permutation σ of order 2 (σ2 = Id),
which is a transposition, or a product of transpositions with disjoint cycles.
Thus, we can define the sets Cid and Cad :
Cid = {c ∈ C | σ(c) = c} and Cad = {c+ σ(c) | c ∈ C},
with respective dimension kid and kad. Cid is by definition the idempotent sub-
code of C. Cad is what we call the σ-subcode of C. It is the one which interests
us.
3 Dimension of the σ-subcode
First, we prove their inclusion and that they are really subcodes.
Proposition 1. Cid and Cad are subcodes of C and we have the chain of inclu-
sion Cad ⊆ Cid ⊆ C.
Proof. It is easy to show that :
• Let c1, c2 ∈ Cid. Then, by linearity, σ(c1 + c2) = σ(c1)+ σ(c2) = c1 + c2 and
Cid is a subcode of C.
• Let c1, c2 ∈ Cad. Then c1 = c+ σ(c) and c2 = c
′ + σ(c′) for c, c′ ∈ C.
So c1 + c2 = c+ c
′ + σ(c) + σ(c′) = (c+ c′) + σ(c+ c′) ∈ Cad and Cad is also
a subcode of C.
• Let c1 ∈ Cad. Then c1 = c+ σ(c) for some c ∈ C. So σ(c1) = σ(c) + σ
2(c) =
σ(c) + c = c1 , because σ
2 = Id, and c1 ∈ Cid, which completes the proof.
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⊓⊔
There are two possibilities :
- either all the codewords verify σ(c) = c and then Cid = C with kid = k.
- either there is at least one codeword (and so many others) which do not
verify this relation and then Cid ⊂ C with kid < k.
Our interest is on the other inclusion Cad ⊆ Cid.
What is the relation between k, kid and kad ?
Can we have Cad = Cid, that is Cid ⊆ Cad ?
The following proposition answers the first question :
Proposition 2. Let kid and kad be the respective dimension of the subcodes
defined above. We have the relation :kad = k − kid
Proof. Let G be a generator matrix of C ,
G =


g1
g2
...
gk


with gi ∈ (F2)
n
. Let σ(G) be the matrix
σ(G) =


σ(g1)
σ(g2)
...
σ(gk)

 .
We rearrange G by making linear combinations on its rows and we obtain
another generator matrix :
G′ =


c1
...
ckid
c′1
...
c′k−kid


with (ci)1≤i≤kid ∈ Cid and (c
′
i)1≤i≤k−kid /∈ Cid.
In fact to do this, just take a basis of Cid (for example by computing the kernel
of G− σ(G)) and complete it to have a basis for C.
The first kid rows is a generator matrix Idem for Cid. The other k−kid rows
form an other matrix which we call X. So G′ =
(
Idem
X
)
.
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We have
G′ + σ(G′) =
(
0
X + σ(X)
)
=


0
...
0
c′1 + σ(c
′
1)
...
c′k−kid + σ(c
′
k−kid
)


.
By definition, G′ + σ(G′) is a generator matrix for Cad. Hence, to obtain infor-
mation on kad, we need information on the rank of G
′ + σ(G′), that is the rank
of X + σ(X). Yet, we only know that kad = rank(X + σ(X)) ≤ k− kid Suppose
that rank(X + σ(X)) < k − kid.
Then there exists (bi)2≤i≤k−kid ∈ (F2)
k−kid−1, non constant zero sequence,
such that c′1 + σ(c
′
1) =
k−kid∑
i=2
bi(c
′
i + σ(c
′
i)).
So, because of characteristic 2 and by linearity of the action of σ on the
vector coordinates, c′1 +
k−kid∑
i=2
bi ∗ c
′
i = σ
(
c′1 +
k−kid∑
i=2
bi ∗ c
′
i
)
.
This implies that c′1 +
k−kid∑
i=2
bi ∗ c
′
i ∈ Cid and again there exists (dj)1≤j≤kid ∈
(F2)
kid , non constant zero sequence, such that c′1 +
k−kid∑
i=2
bi ∗ c
′
i =
kid∑
j=1
dj ∗ cj .
But, in this case, (c1, . . . , ckid , c
′
1, . . . , c
′
k−kid
) is a linearly dependent set of
vectors, which contradicts the fact that C is of dimension k. So, we must have
kad = rank(X + σ(X)) = k − kid.
⊓⊔
Remark : The construction of G′ can be done differently which permits to
understand this proposition in another way. Take again the generator matrices
G =


g1
g2
...
gk

 and G′ =


c1
...
ckid
c′1
...
c′kad


of C. Without loss of generality, we can begin by g1. There are two possibilities:
• either g1 ∈ Cid, equivalently σ(g1) = g1 : in this case g1 = ci (for some
i ∈ [1, . . . , kid]) and this increases kid by 1
• either g1 /∈ Cid, equivalently σ(g1) 6= g1 : in this other case, g1 = c
′
i and
σ(g1) = c
′
j(possibly +
∑
cl) (for some i, j ∈ [1, . . . , kad]). Then g1 + σ(g1) ∈
Cad and g1 + σ(g1) = ca (for some a ∈ [1, . . . , kid]), which increases kad and
kid by 1.
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And so on with g2, . . . , gk, taking care to drop the gs which have already been
used before.
Corollary 1. Let kid and kad be the respective dimension of the subcodes defined
above. We have kid ≥
k
2 and kad ≤
k
2 .
Proof. The inclusion Cad ⊆ Cid implies kad = k − kid ≤ kid. ⊓⊔
4 Idea to use the permutation group for decoding
A way to use, as in introduction, linear combinations of type
∑
i λiσ
i(y) =∑
i λiσ
i(c)+
∑
i λiσ
i(e) has already been studied in [12] to improve the McEliece
cryptosystem. The aim was to choose good combinations so that
∑
i λiσ
i(e) is
still of weight ≤ t, where σ is the Frobenius automorphism of an extension field.
Here is another way to use it for decoding. Suppose again that σ ∈ Perm(C)
is of order 2 and restart from y = c + e. We obtain σ(y) = σ(c) + σ(e), where
σ(c) is still a word of C and σ(e) is still an error vector of length n and weight
t.
Then we can compute y′ = y+σ(y) = c+σ(c)+e+σ(e), where c′ = c+σ(c)
is a codeword living in the σ-subcode of C and e′ = e + σ(e) is still an error
vector of length n but of weight ≤ 2 ∗ t (mostly 2 ∗ t << n).
As seen in previous section, the dimension kad of the σ-subcode Cad is such
that 0 ≤ kad ≤
k
2 . Although the number of error bits in e
′ can have been
doubled, if this dimension kad is low enough, we can do a decoding exhaustive
search in Cad. It will probably enable to find the possible values for e
′ and will
give informations on the position of the error bits of e.
5 Examples
Here are several examples on some types of codes with different permutations
σ. All computations were performed with magma.
5.1 BCH code
Let C be a binary primitive narrow-sense [15, 5, 7] BCH code with designed
distance 7, generated by
G =


1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1

 =


c1
c2
c3
c4
c5

 .
We obtain that #Perm(C) = 20160 and we have 315 permutations of order 2
(product of transpositions with disjoint cycles). There are two cases :
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∗ If we take σ = (1, 2)(6, 9)(10, 15)(12, 14) ∈ Perm(C), then
{0, c1 + c2} = Cad ⊂ Cid = 〈c3, c4, c5, c1 + c2〉
kad = 1 and kid = 4
105 permutations of order 2 in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations
are all a product of 4 transpositions with disjoint cycles. In this case, the
σ-subcode is a [15, 1, 8] code.
∗ If we take σ = (1, 2)(3, 12)(4, 8)(6, 13)(7, 9)(11, 14) ∈ Perm(C), then
< c5, c1 + c2 + c4 >= Cad ⊂ Cid = 〈c3, c5, c1 + c2 + c4〉
kad = 2 and kid = 3
210 permutations in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations are all a
product of 6 transpositions with disjoint cycles. In this case, the σ-subcode
is a [15, 2, 7] code.
5.2 Quasi-cyclic code
Let C be a binary [15, 5, 6] quasi-cyclic code, generated by
G =


1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0

 =


c1
c2
c3
c4
c5

 .
We obtain that #Perm(C) = 3840 and we have 311 permutations of order 2
(product of transpositions with disjoint cycles). There are three cases :
∗ If we take σ = (1, 15) ∈ Perm(C), then
{0} = Cad ⊂ Cid = C
kad = 0 and kid = 5
31 permutations of order 2 in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations
are a product from 1 to 5 transpositions with disjoint cycles.
∗ If we take σ = (1, 2)(4, 13)(9, 10)(11, 15) ∈ Perm(C), then
{0, c1 + c2} = Cad ⊂ Cid = 〈c3, c4, c5, c1 + c2〉
kad = 1 and kid = 4
160 permutations in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations are a
product from 3 to 6 transpositions with disjoint cycles. In this case, the
σ-subcode is a [15, 1, 6] code.
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∗ If we take σ = (1, 2)(3, 4)(5, 14)(6, 7)(9, 10)(11, 15)(12, 13), then
〈c1 + c2, c4 + c5〉 = Cad ⊂ Cid = 〈c3, c1 + c2, c4 + c5〉
kad = 2 and kid = 3
120 permutations in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations are a
product of 6 or 7 transpositions with disjoint cycles. In this case, the σ-
subcode is a [15, 2, 6] code.
5.3 Goppa code
Let now C be a binary [16, 4, 7] Goppa code with F24 as support and whose
generator polynomial is g(x) = x3 + x+ 1.
G =


1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0

 =


c1
c2
c3
c4

 .
We obtain that #Perm(C) = 256 and we have 95 permutations of order 2
(product of transpositions with disjoint cycles). There are three cases :
∗ If we take σ = (3, 6) ∈ Perm(C), then
{0} = Cad ⊂ Cid = C
kad = 0 and kid = 4
63 permutations in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations are a
product from 1 to 5 transpositions with disjoint cycles.
∗ If we take σ = (1, 2)(3, 16)(4, 9)(6, 13)(8, 11)(10, 15) ∈ Perm(C), then
{0, c1 + c2} = Cad ⊂ Cid = 〈c3, c4, c1 + c2〉
kad = 1 and kid = 3
24 permutations in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations are a
product from 5 to 7 transpositions with disjoint cycles. In this case, the
σ-subcode is a [16, 1, 8] code.
∗ If we take σ = (1, 2)(3, 9)(4, 16)(5, 8)(6, 15)(7, 12)(10, 13)(11, 14), then
〈c1 + c2, c3 + c4〉 = Cad = Cid = 〈c1 + c2, c3 + c4〉
kad = 2 and kid = 2
8 permutations in Perm(C) give this result. These permutations are a prod-
uct of 8 transpositions with disjoint cycles. In this case, the σ-subcode is a
[15, 2, 8] code.
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5.4 Remarks
1. The last case Cid = Cad answers the second question of section 3. This case
can obviously happen only if k is even, but the reciprocal is not true.
2. We can notice that the number of transpositions with disjoint cycles involved
in the permutation σ chosen may have an impact on the dimensions. Indeed,
this is understandable : the more you have transpositions in the permutation,
the more you have constraints on the structure, and the more it is difficult for
a codeword to be idempotent. That’s why kid decreases, and on the contrary
kad increases, when we choose σ with many transpositions.
3. Which interests us is Cad and particularly its dimension kad. We see in
examples than kad can be reduced small in practice and this seems to happen
when σ is composed of not many transpositions. Moreover, kad can even be 0.
That’s the best information we can have. Indeed, if we take again y′ = c′+e′,
this means that c′ is directly the zero codeword and that e′ = y′.
For instance, resume the quasi-cyclic case with σ = (1, 15). Two cases :
- The word y′ has a 1-bit on positions 1 and 15, then e has an error position
on 1 or 15 (exclusive or) ;
- The word y′ has a 0-bit on positions 1 and 15, then either e has no error
positions on 1 and 15, either e has an error position on 1 and 15.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we prove bounds on the dimension of a particular subcode of
the idempotent subcode. The results are attractive in practice because the ob-
tained dimensions can be very low. This gives a manner to improve decoding by
collecting information on the error positions of the original error vector.
The next work is to improve the suggested way of decoding in section 4 and
to apply it with the already existing algorithms to see if we can have a real
gain. Try to understand the correlation between the dimensions kid, kad and the
number of transpositions with disjoint cycles involved in σ is also an interesting
way of research. Finally, the ultimate aim is also to see what happens if we take
σ ∈ Perm(C) of order 3 and possibly to generalize.
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